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Guidance and Control Mechanisms for the
Construction of UN-System Law-Sung and
Unsung Tales from the Coalition of the
Willing, or Not
Markus G. Puder, Ph.D.*
ABSTRACT

This article explores guidance and control mechanisms for the
interpretation of the meaning and effects of peace-coercion law created
by the United Nations Security Council, referred to as "UN-system law."
Using the military action against Iraq by the Coalition of the Willing in
2003 as a case study, this article identifies institutions, processes and
procedures for steering and reviewing the construction of UN-system
law-legal input into a government's internal decision process and
judicial proceedings in domestic and international courts of law.
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INTRODUCTION
This article explores guidance and control mechanisms for the
interpretation of the meaning and effects of United Nations (UN) peacecoercion law created by the UN Security Council under the UN
Charter'-hereinafter, UN-system law. It will use as a case study the
controversy over the legality of military action against Iraq by the
Coalition of the Willing 2 in March of 2003.

1.

U.N. Charter, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 933, 3 Bevans 1153

(entered into force on Oct. 24, 1945) [hereinafter U.N. Charter].
2. See Elizabeth Knowles, Coalition ofthe Willing, in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
PHRASE AND FABLE (2006), http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/10214-coalitionofthewill
ing.html ("[C]oalition of the willing-a group of nations agreeing to act together,

especially with military involvement; the term has been particularly associated with those

countries giving active support to American intervention in Iraq in 2003."). For usage of
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Before and after invading Iraq, various coalition members had
justified their military action under the rationale that UN-system law
provided the requisite legal coverage, and that, therefore, a further
authorization through the UN was not required at all. At the time, this
legality rationale was at the center of heated political, diplomatic, and
academic exchanges. Rather than adding one more opinion piece to a
debate conducted long ago, 4 this article identifies current as well as
conceivable institutions and processes for guiding and reviewing the
construction of UN-system law. These mechanisms include legal input
into a decision process within a country's government as well as judicial
proceedings in courts of law.
This article consists of four parts. After briefly recalling the
relevant UN-system law relevant to the Iraq situation, this article turns to
the dynamics surrounding the in-house legal advice from Attorney
General Lord Peter Goldsmith to British Prime Minister Tony Blair when
the case for the war against Iraq was made by Her Majesty's
Government. Next, judicial review in courts of law will be covered.
This portion of the article discusses cases from the United Kingdom, the
Republic of Costa Rica, and the Federal Republic of Germany. It also
works through conceivable judicial proceedings on the international
plane. Finally, this article evaluates the different guidance and control
mechanisms potentially available for the interpretation of UN-system
law.
I.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK: UN-SYSTEM LAW ON THE EVE OF THE
INVASION

This section reviews the UN-system law which framed the debate
over the legality of military action against Iraq by the Coalition of the
Willing. Chapter VII of the UN Charter5 assigns the UN Security
Council the primary responsibility for use-of-force enforcement actions
designed to coerce the maintenance or restoration of international peace
and security.6 However, without the blessing or acquiescence of the UN
the term by U.S. President George W. Bush, see, for example, Bush: Join Coalition of
the Willing, CNN (Nov. 20, 2002), http://edition.cnn.con2002/WORLD/europe/1 1/20
/prague.bush.nato/.
3. See, e.g., Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to JD Negroponte, President of the United Nations Security Council (Mar. 20,
2003), UN Doc S/2003/351.
4. For a concise discussion of the dossier, along with numerous references to the
secondary literature, see William K. Lietzau, Old Laws, New Wars: Jus ad Bellum in an
Age of Terrorism, 8 MAx PLANCK YB. U.N. 383, 420-29 (2004).
5. U.N. Charter arts. 39-51.
6. U.N. Charter arts. 24, 42. See also Uniting for Peace, G.A. Res. 377, U.N. Doc.
A/1775 (Nov. 3, 1950) [hereinafter Uniting for Peace] (purporting the conferral on or the
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Security Council's five permanent members-the French Republic, the
People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of
America-no such action can be taken.7 Their blocking power is
unfettered. In particular, the theory of presuming the UN Security
Council's authorization of an enforcement action in the face of an
unreasonable veto has not been accepted for lack of a basis in law and
precedent under the UN Charter.8 Decisions taken by the UN Security
Council pursuant to Chapter VII are binding on all members9 and take
the form of resolutions.10 As the UN does not have any armed forces at
its disposal, the UN Security Council relies on delegated and authorized
actions by members or regional organizations."
Whether the use of force by the Coalition of the Willing in 2003
was covered by the UN-system law on the books or required yet another
step hinges on three UN Security Council resolutions passed in the
thirteen-year window between the First Gulf Warl 2 and the Second Gulf
War.' 3 When, after its invasion and occupation of Kuwait in the summer
of 1990, Iraq remained unyielding about its noncompliance with a string
of UN Security Council decisions urging withdrawal, the UN Security
Council adopted Resolution 678.14 This resolution-hereinafter, the
liberation decision-gave Iraq a "final opportunity" to comply with the
decisions condemning the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq.' 5
The liberation decision further authorized the member countries
cooperating with Kuwait to "use all necessary means" unless Iraq
complied on or before January 15, 1991.16 As Iraq did not leave by the
deadline, the group of members supporting Kuwait acted on the

recognition in the UN General Assembly of powers to "recommend" collective measures
in the event that the UN Security Council is unable to act).
7. U.N. Charter arts. 23, 27, IT 2-3.
8. LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS 342-43 (Richard Falk, Mark
Juergensmeyer & Vesselin Popovski eds., Oxford Uni. Press 2012); MICHAEL BYERS,
WAR LAW: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND ARMED CONFLICT 1 (2007).

9.
10.

U.N. Charter art. 25.
For the various types of UN resolutions, see Rainer Lagoni, Resolution,

Declaration, Decision, in UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE 1081, 1081-

91 (Rildiger Wolfrum et al. eds., 1995).
11. See U.N. Charter arts. 42-43, 48-49, 53.
12.
See, e.g., MICHAEL R. GORDON & BERNARD E. TRAINOR, THE GENERALS'
WAR (1995); U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, TRIUMPH WITHOUT VICTORY:
THE
UNREPORTED HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR (1992).
13.
See, e.g., WILLIAMSON MURRAY & ROBERT H. SCALES, JR., THE IRAQ WAR: A
MILITARY HISTORY (2003).

14.
15.
16.

S.C. Res. 678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
Id. at T 1.
Id. atT2.
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authorization to use military force.' 7 After Iraq was ejected and
hostilities were suspended, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution
687.18 This resolution-hereinafter, the cease-fire decision-imposed a
robust regime of material conditions for Iraq to unconditionally accept
before a formal cease-fire would be effective. The core of these
conditions pertained to a program for the elimination of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery and support systems.' 9 Other provisions
addressed boundary demarcation,20 return of seized property,2 1
24
The UN
compensation,22 repatriation, 23 and renunciation of terrorism.
Security Council further decided to leave sanctions in place "until a
further decision is taken" 25 and "to remain seized of the matter and to
take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of
the . . resolution and to secure peace and security in the area." 26
More than a decade later, in the wake of numerous forcible
responses to cease-fire violations by Iraq and against the backdrop of the
September 11th attacks in the United States, the UN Security Council
adopted Resolution 1441 .27 This resolution-hereinafter, the last-chance
decision-determined the continued presence of a material breach by
Iraq of the cease-fire decision and other resolutions.28 In this light, it
decided to give Iraq "a final opportunity" to come into compliance with
the relevant UN-system law. 2 9 This decision also established an
"enhanced inspection regime" to see through the disarmament program
imposed by the UN Security Council.30
At its core, the last-chance decision deemed submissions of false
documentation and failures to cooperate in its implementation a further
material breach subject to "assessment" by the UN Security Council, 3
set to convene immediately upon receipt of a report to that regard "in
order to consider the situation and the need for compliance with all

17.
See, e.g., Alan Taylor, Operation Desert Storm: 25 Years Since the First Gulf
War, ATLANTIC (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2016/01/operation-

desert-storm-25-years-since-the-first-gulf-war/424191/.
18. S.C. Res. 687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
19. Id. at¶¶7-13.
20. Id. at ¶¶ 2-3.
21. Id at¶15.
22. Id. at IN 16--19.
23. Id. at TT 30-31.
24. Id atT32.
25. Id. at24.
26. Id. at 34.
27. S.C. Res. 1441 (Nov. 8, 2002).
28. Id at T 1.
29. Id. at T 2.
30. Id.
31. Id. at TT 4, 11, 12.
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relevant resolutions in order to secure international peace and security." 3 2
Additionally, the UN Security Council recalled its repeated warnings to
Iraq "that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued
violations of its obligations." 33 Finally, the UN Security Council decided
"to remain seized of the matter." 34
In the immediate run-up to the invasion, two last-ditch efforts by the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain to pass a "second
resolution" failed.35 On March 20, 2003, without having secured a fresh
authorization from the UN Security Council, the United States and its
coalition partners invaded Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein's regime.36
The legality of the invasion, absent a further UN Security Council
authorization to use force, was the subject of a controversy as to whether
the last-chance decision itself was sufficient to revive the use-of-force
authorization in the liberation decision.
Three opinion camps
crystallized in the course of that revival debate: (1) those affirming the
revival argument in principle and its operations in the Iraq situation; (2)
those denying revival as such or specifically in the Iraq situation; and (3)
those maintaining that the UN-system law on the books was
indeterminate. To rehash the various positions in this debate and their
merits would be redundant.
Unfortunately, however, mechanisms to guide and control the
decisions involving a country's interpretation of UN-system law have
largely been underexplored in the literature. Consequently, important
lessons have remained unidentified, ones that can be learnt by shifting
the visor of the discussion to institutions and processes possibly
accomplishing this important task. Independent professional advice on
international law received from in-house counsel may offer a significant
precautionary check. Yet, what if the advising component and personnel
within the government appear clouded in the public's eye? Would it
matter if the green light from in-house law officers did not rest on the
strongest but merely an arguable legal case? Then, proceedings in

32.
33.
34.

Id. at¶ 12.
Id. at ¶13.
Id. at114.

35.

US.,

UK.,

Spain Introduce New Iraq Resolution, CNN (Feb. 24, 2003),

http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/ meast/02 /24/sprj.irq.wrap/; Provisional S.C. Res.
S/2003/215 (Mar. 7, 2003), http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/ scres/2003/20030307dra
ft.pdf.
36. For the full transcript of the television address by U.S. President George W.
Bush, see Bush Declares War, CNN (Mar. 19, 2003), http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03
/1 9/sprj.irq.int.bush.transcript/.
37. Alex J. Bellamy, InternationalLaw and the War with Iraq, 4 MELB. J. INT'L L.
497, 499-500 (2003).
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international and domestic courts of law could add a powerful dimension
to control the decider.

II.

GOVERNMENT-INTERNAL LEGAL ADVICE GUIDING THE
CONSTRUCTION OF UN-SYSTEM LAW: THE UNITED KINGDOM'S
CASE FOR WAR

Political decision-makers in Her Majesty's Government have
traditionally received legal advice on international law from lawyers.3 8
The advising function is personified by the Attorney General, who serves
as the chief legal counsel to the crown, and ensures that the government
acts in accordance with the law. 39 This is particularly important because
the Attorney General will generally be consulted in decisions of great
import where legal positions are not clear-cut.40
A closer study of the legal advice given by Attorney General Lord
Peter Goldsmith to British Prime Minister Tony Blair in regard to taking
military action against Iraq in 2003 reveals conflict pressures
encountered by in-house counsel in the interface of law and politics. 4 1
Pursuing the questions of how the advising process under the aegis of
Lord Goldsmith unfolded and whether the Attorney General modified his
legal advice in the wake of political pressuring from the Prime Minister
or due to an independent professional evolution in his own legal mind42
has been greatly facilitated by the work of the Iraq Inquiry under the
chairmanship of Sir John Chilcot. 4 3 Launched in 2009 under the charge
to consider how decisions were arrived at and to identify lessons to be
learnt from the Second Gulf War," the Inquiry's committee has made
available online a host of declassified documents, grouped by department
and arranged in a reverse chronological order.45 Moreover, the record
now includes extensive evidence to the Inquiry.46 These primary sources

MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL
38.
COMMENTARY 783 (2014).

LAW-CASES

39.
ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S OFFICE, THE GOVERNANCE
OF
CONSULTATION ON THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 2, 5-6 (2007).

BRITAIN:

Id. at 6.
See id. at 11, 13.

42.
43.

See JANIS &NOYES, supra note 38, at 783-84.
About the Inquiry, IRAQ INQUIRY, http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/about.aspx.

44.

Id

45.

Declassified Documents, IRAQ INQUIRY,

A

'

40.
41.

AND

http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/trans

cripts/declassified-documents.aspx.
46.

Evidence, IRAQ INQUIRY, http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/transcripts.aspx

visited June 16, 2016).

(last
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include the oral testimony and written statements by Lord Goldsmith4 7 as
well as original notes, minutes and letters surrounding his legal advice to
Prime Minister Blair.48
This, of course, supposes that Lord Goldsmith did change his legal
stance in the first place. The strongest suggestion for a change in Lord
Goldsmith's legal posture is contained in a letter by former Foreign and
Commonwealth Deputy Legal Advisor Elizabeth Susan Wilmshurst. Ms.
Wilmshurst's letter, written a couple of days before the invasion, gave
notice of her departure from the office based on a scathing indictment of
the case for war made by Her Majesty's Government.49 In particular,
Ms. Wilmshurst made reference to two shifts in the legal advice given by
Lord Goldsmith:
My views [not agreeing with the proposition that it is lawful to use
force without a second Council resolution] accord . .. with what the

Attorney General gave us to understand was his view prior to his
letter of 7 March. (The view in that letter has of course changed
again into what is now the official line.) 50
This passage had been removed when the letter was first released in
pursuance of an open records request, but it was later obtained by a
The letter diagnosed that, from Ms.
British news channel.s'
Wilmshurst's perspective, Lord Goldsmith's advice took on three
markedly different guises: (1) the official posture on the eve of the
invasion militating for the lawfulness of the use of force; (2) an
intermediate and somewhat more elastic position articulated earlier; and
(3) his original position cautioning that military action would be
unlawful.52 The record as such appears to confirm Lord Goldsmith's
change of heart over time. But in order to determine whether he
massaged his determinations at the government's request, the original
source language in the topical documentation covering the time interval
47. Oral Evidence by Date, Week 8, Jan. 27, 2010, Rt. Hon. Lord Goldsmith Q.C.,
Attorney General, IRAQ INQUIRY, http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/transcripts/oralevidencebydate/100127.aspx [hereinafter 2010 Transcript] (posting the videos of the morning and
afternoon sessions as well as 247-page transcript); Written Evidence by Date, Week 19,
Jan. 17, 2011, Statement by Rt. Hon. Lord Goldsmith Q.C., Attorney General, IRAQ
INQUIRY, http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/50118/lord-goldsmith-statement-to-the-in
quiry.pdf [hereinafter 2011 Statement].
48. Declassified Documents, Attorney General's Office, IRAQ INQUIRY, http://www.
iraqinquiry.org.uk/transcripts/ declassified-documents.aspx.
49. Letter from Elizabeth Wilmshurst, FCO Deputy Legal Adviser, to Michael
Wood, FCO Legal Adviser, Iraq Inquiry (Mar. 18, 2003), http://www.iraqinquiry
.org.uk/media/43719/document2010-01-27-100908.pdf (on early retirement/ resignation).
50. Id.
51.
Wilmshurst Resignation Letter, BBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2005), http://news.bbc.co
.uk/2/hi/uk-news/politics/4377605.stm.
52. See Letter from Elizabeth Wilmshurst, supra note 49, at T 1.
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between the advent of the last-chance decision and the unleashing of
force must be looked at more closely.
On March 17, 2003, a few days before the invasion, Lord
Goldsmith articulated the official line in law within a written public
statement responding to a parliamentary question by Baroness Ramsay of
Cartvale who inquired about his view in regard to the presence of a
Lord
sufficient legal basis for the use of force against Iraq.s3
Goldsmith's words were unequivocal, albeit clothed in the terse style of a
French pr6cis:
[T]he authority to use force under [the liberation decision] has
revived and so continues today. . . . [A]ll that [the last-chance

decision] requires is reporting to and discussion by the Security
Council of Ira 's failures, but not an express further decision to
authorise force.
However, documents under Lord Goldsmith's signature, which
were secret at the time, paint a picture in flux. A few days after the UN
Security Council had passed the last-chance decision, the Attorney
General advised the offices of the Prime Minister and the Foreign
Secretary that despite "Chinese whispers" to the contrary, he was "not at
all optimistic" but "in fact pessimistic" that an Iraqi breach of the
resolution at some future point in time would, absent a second UN
Security Council resolution, justify military action.ss Consistent with
this skeptical posture, Lord Goldsmith set out his provisional views in a
draft note, which was passed to Prime Minister Blair on January 14,
2003.6 The key passage of the note more fully expressed the reasoning
behind Lord Goldsmith's view that extant UN Security Council
resolutions did not suffice as a legal basis for proceeding with the
invasion:

[M]y opinion is that [the last-chance decision] does not revive the
authorization to use of force contained in [the liberation decision] in
the absence of a further decision of the Security Council. The
53. H.L. Hansard, Written Answers on Iraq: Legality ofArmed Force, cols. WA2-3
(Mar. 17, 2003), http://www. publications.parliament.uk/palld2002O3/ldhansrd/vo030317
/text/30317w01.htm#30317w01_spnew2.
54. Id.
55. David Brummel, Iraq: Note of Telephone Conversation Between the Attorney
General and Jonathan Powell, IRAQ INQUIRY, ¶ 2 (Nov. 11, 2002), http://www.iraq
inquiry.org.uk/media/46475/AGO-note-of-Goldsmith-Powell-teleconl lNovember2002.
pdf; David Brummel, Iraq: Note Telephone Conversation Between Foreign Secretary
and the Attorney General, IRAQ INQUIRY, ¶ 2 (Nov. 12, 2002), http://www.iraqinqui
ry.org.uk/media/43505/doc_2010 01_ 26_11_03_33_493.pdf
56. See generally Lord Goldsmith, Iraq: Interpretationof Resolution 1441, IRAQ
INQUIRY (Jan. 14, 2003), http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/46493/Goldsmith-draftadvice- 14January2003.pdf.
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difference between this view of the resolution and the approach
which argues that no further decision is required is narrow, but key. 57
In his terse note, Lord Goldsmith did not reject the revival argument
as such, but insisted that revival in the Iraq situation required a fresh
authorization from the UN Security Council. He thus leaned toward the
view generally prevailing in the United Kingdom, namely that, in light of
its exceptional character, the use of force must have a positive and
express power base in international law. 8 However, Lord Goldsmith's
legal position clashed with Prime Minister Blair's dual commitment of
standing shoulder to shoulder with President Bush,59 while giving the
public the assurance that any action would only be taken in accordance
60
with international
law.
Switching into listening mode over the next few weeks, Lord
Goldsmith met with Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and Sir Jeremy
Greenstock, the British Ambassador to the UN, to learn more about the
negotiating and drafting history of the last-chance decision. 6 ' Moreover,
he took the opportunity to hear out the views of his U.S. counterparts.62
His endeavors were all about bringing to light the best arguments as to
63

why a further UN Security Council decision was unnecessary.
In the next phase, Lord Goldsmith's view started to shift. On
January 30, 2003, he addressed a short minute to Prime Minister Blair. 4
In his dense one-pager, he advised:
You should be aware that, notwithstanding the additional arguments
put to me since our last discussion, I remain of the view that the
correct legal interpretation of [the last-chance decision] is that it does

not authorise the use of military force without a further determination

57. Id. at¶ 13.
58. See Cathy Adams, Iraq: Meeting with David Manning, IRAQ INQUIRY, ¶ 4 (Oct.
14, 2002) [hereinafter Adams Meeting], http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/52459/ada
ms-goldsmith-meeting-manning-2002-10-14.pdf.
59. See Richard Norton-Taylor, Blair-Bush Deal before Iraq War Revealed in
Secret Memo, GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2006, 8:27 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world
/2006/feb/ 03/iraq.usa.
60.
See Adams Meeting, supra note 58.
61.
JAmNs & NOYES, supra note 38, at 783.

62.

Id.

63.

Letter from Cathy Adams, Legal Secretariat to the Law Officers, Attorney

General's Chambers, to Sir David Manning, UK Foreign Policy Advisor, Iraq, 1 1-6
(Jan. 28, 2003), http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/52 462/adams-manning-iraq-200301-28.pdf.
64. See generally Lord Goldsmith, Note to Prime Minister on Iraq, IRAQ INQUIRY
(Jan. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Goldsmith Note to PM], http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/

media/46496/Goldsmith-note-to-PM-3OJanuary2003.pdf
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by the Security Council . . . . But having considered the arguments
on both sides, my view remains that a further decision is required. 65

In a somewhat admonishing tone, Lord Goldsmith still adhered to
what he described as the "correct" view, that, absent a fresh UN Security
Council decision, the use of force was not authorized.66 Barely a
fortnight later, Lord Goldsmith offered his pre-final draft advice, along
with his legal interpretation of the last-chance decision.67 At this stage of
the advising process, he inserted a surprise of sorts.
After an in-depth discussion identifying and weighing both sides of
the argument as to what action the UN Security Council would be
required to take when receiving a report that Iraq was in breach of the
last-chance decision,'68 Lord Goldsmith concluded that the language of
the instrument was not clear and that the statements made when the
resolution was adopted suggested a divergence of views among members
of the UN Security Council.6 9 In this light, he recommended "as the
safest legal course" to secure the passage of a further UN Security
Council decision authorizing the use of force. 70 Lord Goldsmith's
memorandum could have continued here with the paragraph describing
the kind of public defense that needed to be advanced by Her Majesty's
Government were action taken without another UN Security Council
decision. 7 1 Rather than proceeding in this fashion, Lord Goldsmith's
draft advice offered the following key paragraph:
Nevertheless, having regard to the arguments of our co-sponsors
which I heard in Washington, I am prepared to accept that a
reasonable case can be made that [the last-chance decision] revives
the authorization to use force in [the liberation decision] . . . (Indeed,
it seems to me that the case for the legality of military action now
without a further resolution is rather stronger than it was [in relation
to Operation Desert Fox] in December 1998 . . .72

The sheer presence of this one paragraph marked a turning point in
the advising process. Here, Lord Goldsmith started to signal a different
65.
66.

Id. at¶ 4.
See id.

67.
See generally Lord Goldsmith, Draft Advice to Prime Minister on Iraq:
InterpretationofResolution 1441, IRAQ INQUIRY (Feb. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Goldsmith
Draft Advice], http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/46490/Goldsmith-draft-advice-12Fe

bruary2003.pdf.
68.
See id. at TT 9-11.
69.
Id. at T 12.
70.
Id.
71.
Id. at¶14.
72. Id. at ¶ 13. On the PDF file made available by Iraq Inquiry, the bracketed
sentence starting with "Indeed" and ending with "1205" is crossed by three diagonal lines

drawn by hand. Id.
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posture in law, albeit still somewhat cautious in form and contours.
Deploying the conjunctive adverb "nevertheless"7 3 at the start of this
passage, Lord Goldsmith prefaced his remarkable concession. He
relinquished his previous position "I remain of the view that the correct
legal interpretation"74 in favor of "I am prepared to accept that a
reasonable case can be made." 75 In the context of the Iraq situation, the
reasonable case pertained to the argument that the last-chance decision
itself revived the use-of-force authorization contained in the liberation
decision. However, beyond the reference to Operation Desert Fox,76
Lord Goldsmith did not expand on where the notion of a reasonable case
came from and what exactly it stood for.
Finally, five weeks later, in a legal memorandum of 35 paragraphs
on 13 pages addressed to Prime Minister Blair and dated March 7, 2003,
Lord Goldsmith completed his pivot. 77 Explaining the operations of the
revival argument, which had been touched upon in the draft, took up the
bulk of the memorandum.78 At the outset, Lord Goldsmith determined
that in principle, the revival argument had a sound legal basis in
international law. 79
He then addressed the legal considerations
surrounding the question of the self-sufficiency of the last-chance
decision itself as a trigger of revival80 in the light of two competing
propositions-whether the use-of-force authorization remained if the UN
81
Security Council had a discussion but did not reach a conclusion, or
whether nothing short of a further UN Security Council decision
After subjecting the two interpretation
accomplished revival.82
alternatives to an extensive discussion, which included a review of the
textual choices made in the last-chance decision and the drafting history
of the last-chance decision, Lord Goldsmith summarized his core
73. See MARTHA KOLLN & ROBERT FUNK, UNDERSTANDING ENGLISH GRAMMAR 295
(2006).
74. Goldsmith Note to PM, supra note 64, at ¶ 4.
75. Goldsmith Draft Advice, supra note 67, at ¶ 13.
76. See, e.g., Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons of Desert Fox: A Preliminary
Analysis, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (Feb. 16, 1999),
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/dflessons21599.pdf (discussing the four-day bombing
campaign conducted by the United States and the United Kingdom to degrade Iraqi
capabilities in the wake of what both countries considered Iraq's failures to comply with
UN-system law and its cat-and-mouse game with UN weapons inspectors).
77. See generally Lord Goldsmith, Final Advice to Prime Minister on Iraq:
InterpretationofResolution 1441, GUARDIAN (Mar. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Goldsmith Final
Advice], http://image.guardian.co.uk/sysfiles/Guardian/ documents/2005/04/28/legal.pdf.
78. See id. at ¶¶ 7-25.
79. See id at¶7-11.
80. See id. at ¶¶ 12-25.
81. See id. at TT 14-15.
82. See id at ¶ 14, 16.
83. See id. at ¶T 17-25.
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conclusions and professional advice in bold print.84 In this portion of the

document, he expended more language covering the notion of a
"reasonable case." In addition to embracing the arguments advanced by

the U.S. administration, Lord Goldsmith was further persuaded by
precedents of military action on the authority of advice from his
predecessors in instances where the use of force was "no more than

reasonably arguable."

Lord Goldsmith then hastened to countenance:

But a 'reasonable case' does not mean that if the matter ever came
before a court I would be confident that the court would agree with
this view. I judge that, having regard to the arguments on both sides,
and considering the [last-chance decision] as a whole in the light of
the statements made on adoption and subsequently, a court might
well conclude that [its key operative paragraphs] do require a further
Council decision in order to revive the authorisation in [the liberation
decision]. But equally I consider that the counter view can be
reasonably maintained. However, it must be recognized that on
previous occasions when military action was taken on the basis of a
reasonably arguable case, the degree of public and Parliamentary
86
scrutiny of the legal issue was nothing like as great as it is today.

In comparison to his draft advice, which he may or may not have
been penned himself,87 Lord Goldsmith's final memorandum more fully

advanced his shift of opinion in favor of a reasonable case posture.
Facially, however, he still stopped short of stating that the presence of a
reasonable case was enough for the government to go ahead with the
invasion even absent a fresh UN Security Council authorization.
Lord Goldsmith's final internal articulation of his new position did
not arrive by way of an addendum or codicil to the final advice
memorandum under his own signature, but was recorded by his legal
secretary, David Brummel, in a discussion note, dated March 13, 2003.88
This legal position was dubbed the "better view."89 In substance, it
affirmed that the revival argument was legally sound and that the
conditions for its operations were met in the case of Iraq. 90 The note
expended much effort to assure a normalcy in the evolution and
formulation of Lord Goldsmith's legal advice.
Lord Goldsmith
84. See id. at¶¶ 26-31.
85. See id. at T 30.
86. Id.
87. 2010 Transcript,supra note 47, at 125 ("I'm not sure I drafted it.").
88. See generally David Brummel, Note about a Discussion with the Attorney
General on Iraq: the Legal Basis for Use of Force, IRAQ INQUIRY (Mar. 13, 2003)
[hereinafter Brummel Note], http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/43716/document201001-27-100801.pdf.
89. Id. at TT 2, 4, 7, Further Note.
90. Id. at TT 1-2.
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continued to give the revival argument additional consideration and
further reflection in light of his own study of additional materials and in
response to input from within the Her Majesty's Government and the
U.S. Administration. 91 He also found his modified view, which he had
reached "earlier in the week," perfectly reconcilable with his earlier final
advice memorandum to the Prime Minister as that document was meant
to elucidate the competing arguments.92 Another four days after Mr.
Brummel had logged the conversation, Lord Goldsmith's legal position
went public on March 17, 2003, by being deployed, as endeavored, first
in Parliament and then in the cabinet.93
Considering the evolution of the advising process over time, there is
nothing extraordinary about a lawyer changing his mind over a legal
position.
Yet, the allegations that Lord Goldsmith was bullied
throughout his involvement as legal advisor in the decision process,
gagged, excluded, and pinned to the wall have persisted.94 When giving
his oral testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, he endeavored to fill some of the
holes with regard to his role and input in the decision process, especially
in terms of his personal integrity and professional judgment throughout.95
He assured that, above all, "what [he] was anxious to do . .. was to reach
a correct legal view."9 6 Notwithstanding his own personal preferences,
Lord Goldsmith did express regrets about not having had much of a
voice in the cabinet meetings on the Iraq situation, the negotiations over
the last-chance decision, and the formulation of the post-adoption
statements, especially since he had never received a formal instruction to
advise from his client-Prime Minister Blair. 97 Lord Goldsmith insisted
that once prompted into an advising mode a professional legal adviser
was bound to speak truth to power.9 8 Indeed, he had gone on record to
protect the propriety of the legal advising process within Her Majesty's
Government in relation to military action against Iraq. In a somewhat
caustic note to Foreign Secretary Straw, which was drafted at the time
when his own position moved from being skeptical of to endorsing the
lawfulness of military action without a further UN Security Council
decision, Lord Goldsmith made a strongly worded case for allowing the
law officers in the government to discharge their role in a milieu of
91. See id. at¶¶ 1-2, 5.
92. Id. at¶7.
93. See id. at¶8.
94. See, e.g., Simon Walters, Iraq Inquiry Bombshell: Secret Letter to Reveal New
Blair War Lies, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 29, 2009, 8:48 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.
uk/news/article- 1231746/Secret-letter-reveal-new-Blair-war-lies.html.
95. See 2010 Transcript, supra note 47, at 245.
96. Id. at 27.
97. See id. at 16, 26, 28, 36, 67, 102.
98. Id at 93-94.
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independence, objectivity, and impartiality. 99 He also drew the attention
to avenues and mechanisms available to a minister when disagreeing
with an advisor, that is, principally, to seek an opinion from the law
officers.' 0 0 Earlier, Mr. Straw had chided Foreign and Commonwealth
Legal Advisor Michael Wood for not offering more nuanced advice on
the Iraq situation as an alternative to the view that it would be unlawful
to proceed with the military action.'o
Years later, in his oral and written evidence to the Iraq Inquiry,
Lord Goldshith shed further light on the notion of a reasonable case in
general and its significance in the Iraq situation. He explained that the
test for a reasonable, or respectable, case was one "that you would be
content to argue in court with a reasonable prospect of success."1 0 2 Lord
Goldsmith further advised that, in light of precedent established in
previous cases, the presence of a reasonably arguable case constituted a
basis for his green light to proceed with military action.1 03 Recalling that
he was satisfied that there was a reasonable case at the time when his
draft advice was prepared,1 0 4 Lord Goldsmith noted that, after he had
given his final advice, he spoke of the "better" view as such in response
to a specific request for clarity by the civil service and the armed
forces. 0 5
Moreover, he made very clear that, from his advising
perspective, indeterminacy was not an option.1 0 6 Therefore, he actually
had to come down on one side of the argument' 0 7 and make a
determination. os According to Lord Goldsmith, the law was in the lastchance decision and the professional advisor then had to distill what it
was and what it required.1 09 For this purpose, he used a test querying
"[w]hich side of the argument would you prefer to be on[.]"" 0 One of
the central decision clinchers for him was tied to the American red line,
which was all about not being locked into what the U.S. Administration

99. Lord Goldsmith, Minute to Foreign Secretary re: Legal Advice and Law
Officers, IRAQ INQUIRY, ¶ 2 (Feb. 3, 2003), http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/43514/
doc 2010 01_26_11 04_38 615.pdf.
100. Id. at¶3.
101. Jack Straw, Note from Foreign Secretary Jack Straw to Michael Wood (FCO
Legal Advisor) re: Iraq: Legal Basis for Use of Force, IRAQ INQUIRY (Jan. 29, 2003),
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/43511/doc_201001_26_11 04_18456.pdf.
102. 2010 Transcript, supra note 47, at 97-98; 2011 Statement, supra note 47, at 1214.
103.

2010 Transcript, supranote 47, at 125, 174.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 125.
Id. at 184-187.
Id. at 171,43-44.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 43-44.
See 2011 Statement, supra note 47, at 12-13.

110.

2010 Transcript,supra note 47, at 118.

.
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and its legal team sought to avoid in the first place-a further decision
beyond a mere discussion in the UN Security Council."' In that context,
Lord Goldsmith emphasized, the Americans succeeded in protecting
their position in the text of the last-chance resolution, an outcome which
the French were on record for having known at the time. 112
In view of the criticism in the public space, Lord Goldsmith
suggested that his role and input, as it evolved, was consistent with
established procedure, practice, and precedent.' 13 He did however
counsel that the decision process within Her Majesty's Government
could have benefited from "a degree of formality and structure in the
way [the country] gets to a decision"1 l 4 as well as "elements of planning
from the legal side . . . at an earlier stage." 15
Finally, while in office and after his departure, Lord Goldsmith
made very clear that he advised from the vantage point of a wig-andgown barrister' 16 keen on staving off potential challenges in court. Aside
from deploying a pleadings style in his oral and written communications,
Lord Goldsmith's central rationale for the legality of the invasion-the
presence of a reasonably arguable case for action-was predicated on
how it could and would stand up in court if challenged.' 17 In this light,
the next section explores how the legality of military action in Iraq
without a further UN Security Council authorization became or could
have become the subject ofjudicial review proceedings.
III. THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN CONTROLLING THE
CONSTRUCTION OF UN-SYSTEM LAW BY ADVISERS AND

DECIDERS: PROCEEDINGS IN COURTS OF LAW

Lord Goldsmith himself broached the theme of judicial review in
his final advice memorandum when he described the possible
consequences of action without a second resolution on the basis of a
reasonably arguable case. 18 He noted that those interested "[in getting] a
case of some sort off the ground," domestically or internationally, could
have availed themselves of a number of very different possibilities in
court, some more remote than others." 9

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 87, 111, 114,126-128, 241.
Id at 48.
See id. at 244-46.
Id. at 244-45
Id. at 245.
Id at 55-56.

117.

2011 Statement, supra note 47, at 12; 2010 Transcript, supra note 47, at 97-98;

Goldsmith Final Advice, supra note 77, at ¶ 32.
118. Goldsmith Final Advice, supra note 77, at IT 32-35.
119. Id. at¶T 32, 35.
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The Domestic Plane

Lawsuits arising from the Iraq situation were seen through in the
United Kingdom, 12 0 the Republic of Costa Rica, 12 1 and the Federal
Republic of Germany.122 Each reflects a particular judicial review model
and culture.
A closer look at these cases yields two parameters, which can have
a powerful impact on whether or not the construction of UN-system law
by the executive branch is reviewed in courts of law. First, legal systems
vary with regard to the significance of a political question doctrine-a
preliminary filter allowing the courts to sidestep highly political or
heavily politicized matters. Second, legal systems differ in how they
position international law in their municipal legal orders. Choices made
in this regard are either monist or dualist. After introducing the three
cases, both parameters will be discussed through the prisms of their
doctrinal frameworks and practical operations in each case.
1.

Case Studies: United Kingdom, Costa Rica, and Germany

UN-system law in the Iraq situation came before municipal courts
in three countries. The following passages offer a brief synopsis of each
case.
a.
The British Case: Interpretation of Meaning and Effects of the
Last-Chance Decision Foreclosed by Justiciability Doctrines
In the late autumn of 2002, soon after the last-chance decision had
been adopted, the question of how to construe the meaning and effects of
the topical UN-system law was tested in a court of law. The Campaign
for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), a British not-for-profit anti-war protest
organization, 12 initiated proceedings against Prime Minister Tony Blair,
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon in the

120. See Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament v. The Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and The
Secretary of State for Defence Advisory declaration [2002] EWHC 2777 (Admin) (QBD)
(UK).
121. Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Res. No. 2004-09992, Dkt.
No. 03-004485-0007-CO (Costa Rica Sept. 8, 2004, 2:31 PM), http://sitios.poderjudicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional/Constitucion%20Politica/Sentencias/2004/04-09992.htm.
122. Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court] June 21,
2005, 2 WD 12.04 (21), http://www.bverwg.de/entscheidungen/pdf/210605U2WD12.
04.0.pdf.
123. For its strategic objectives and policies, see About CND, CAMPAIGN FOR
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT (June 15, 2016, 9:10 PM), http://www.cnduk.org/about/aims-apolicies. See also PAUL BYRNE, THE CAMPAIGN FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT (1988).
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Administrative Courtl 24-a specialist court within the Queen's Bench
Division of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, which,
through the procedure of judicial review, exercises supervisory
jurisdiction over persons discharging a public law function. 125
CND asked the Administrative Court for a declaration determining
the meaning of the last-chance decision and more specifically, whether,
absent a fresh UN Security Council decision, the last-chance decision
authorized UN members to take military action if Iraq found itself in
breach of its terms.1 26 Because no actual decision amenable to a
challenge existed at the time, CND only sought advisory relief. 127 CND
asserted that the peremptory norm of customary international law
prohibiting the unlawful use of force was part of English common law;
hence the court's conventional common law supervisory jurisdiction was
triggered.1 28 CND argued that their case on the true construction of UNsystem law, which they insisted was one in law and not about policy
considerations, factual disputes, or international developments, was not
merely arguable but strong.1 29 This, according to CND, was especially
due to the great public interest in ensuring that the government would
know what the law actually was so that it did not use military action in
the mistaken belief that it was lawful to do so when it was not.1 30
Her Majesty's Government countered that the relief sought by CND
was detrimental to the national interest of the United Kingdom. A
decision in favor of CND would prematurely forecast, disclose, and
freeze in place a chiseled legal position of the executive, whilst its
conduct of international affairs in general and diplomatic negotiations at
the UN required unencumbered adaptability and agility. 13 1
Ultimately, CND's application did not survive the preliminary
stage, which had been limited to issues of justiciability, prematurity, and
standing.1 32 The three judges ruled that they had no power to declare the
true interpretation of the last-chance decision. Describing CND's request
as a "novel and ambitious claim",1 33 the Administrative Court dismissed
the application as non-justiciable based on two reasons.1 34 First, the
124.
125.

Campaignfor NuclearDisarmament, [2002] EWHC 2777.
Royal Courts of Justice and Rolls Building Courts, Administrative Court,
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, (June 15, 2016, 9:10 PM), http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/rcjrolls-building/administrative-court.
126. The Campaignfor Nuclear Disarmament,[2002] EWHC 2777, at ¶ [2].
127. Id.
128. Id. at T [17]
129. Id. at T [10].
130. Id. at ¶ [11]-[13].
131. Id. at T [5], [7].
132. Id. at T [7].
133. Id. at T [2].
134. Id. at I [47].
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court had no jurisdiction to interpret UN-system law, which, unlike
customary international law, did not form part of English common law
and operated solely on the international plane, without any foothold in
domestic law in terms of construing a person's right and duties under
English law. 135 Second, the court needed to abstain, as a matter of
discretion or as a matter of jurisdiction, from determining the question
because a ruling would tie the government's hands in its negotiations
with other countries and thereby damage the public interest in the fields
of national security, defense, and international affairs and relations. 13 6
b.
The Costa Rican Case: Foreign Policy Communiqu6 in
Support of the Coalition Annulled by Constitutional Guardian for
Infringing UN-System Law
In Costa Rica, the construction of UN-system law with regard to the
Iraq situation took center stage in the spring of 2003. Luis Roberto
Zamora Bolafios and others, in their personal capacities and as
representatives of various professional and advocacy organizations,
instituted
actions
of
unconstitutionality
(accidnes
de
inconstitucionalidad) in the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Costa Rica (Sala Constitucional de la Corte
Suprema de Justiciade la Repdblica de Costa Rica).13 7 They challenged
the Foreign Policy Communiqu6 of March 19, 2003, signed by President
Abel Pacheco de la Espriella and Minister of Foreign Relations and
Worship Roberto Tovar Faja, which, along with other pronouncements,
not only gave expression of Costa Rica's support of the U.S.-led
international alliance in the fight against terror but also explained Costa
Rica's appearance on the White House's web-based list of countries
ostensibly committed to the anti-terror cause.138 The complaints asserted
that the support by Costa Rica's executive for the military operations in
Iraq amounted to a complete disrespect for the engagement of the UN
Security Council in the process of finding a solution to the conflict, and
hence negated the very objectives pursued by the international
community through the creation of the UN. 13 9 According to the

135.
136.
[47].
137.

Id.at¶¶ [47],[23],[36]-[40].
Campaignfor Nuclear Disarmament, [2002] EWHC 2777, at T

¶ [41]-[43],

See Lisbeth Zamora Bolafhos, Roberto Zamora Bolailos: Presidente Deberia

Llevarsea la Corte de la Haya, SEMINARIO

UNIVERSIDAD

(Sept.

16,

2004),

http://semanariouniversidad.ucr.cr/universitarias/roberto-zamora-bolaos-presidentedebera-llevarse-a-la-corte-de-la-haya/.
138. See id.
139. Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Res. No. 2004-09992, Dkt.
No. 03-004485-0007-CO, Resultando ¶ 2 (Costa Rica Sept. 8, 2004, 2:31 PM),
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petitioners, not only did the UN Charter provide for a mechanism,
through the UN Security Council, to authorize the use of force in
general; more specifically, the Iraq situation was the subject of a UN
Security Council resolution, the last-chance decision, which had been
endorsed but subsequently and inexplicably left aside by Costa Rica's
executive.140 The Government of Costa Rica countered that there was no
infringement of the last-chance decision, because the resolution covered
actions similar to the one taken by the State of Costa Rica; it simply
demanded compliance with UN-system law. 14 1
By a unanimous vote of its seven magistrates, the Constitutional
Chamber sided with the petitioners and annulled the Communiqu6 for
infringing Costa Rica's Political Constitution and UN-system law. 142
After deducing the capacity of the value of peace to serve as a
constitutional parameter validly equipped to confront and adjudge the
acts of public authorities in general and the executive branch in
particular, 143 the court emphasized that Costa Rica's pacifist tradition
required adherence to the iihternational system under the auspices of the
UN, which had been designed to replace the use of force as a national
instrument of policy and international relations.'" Therefore, UNsystem law had to be considered incorporated into the domestic fabric as
a controlling limit applicable to the actions of Costa Rican authorities.1 45
More specifically, UN-system law restricted their radius in the field of
international relations, which made it impossible for the government to
associate its foreign policy, even by way of mere moral support, with
military activities outside or even in parallel with the system of the UN
as a means of conflict resolution.1 4 6 Consequently, the court rejected the
argument of the Government of Costa Rica that review of support for
military action was not within the purview of the courts without a
declaration as to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of armed operations in
Iraq.1 47 The court found the question to be much narrower.
Costa Rica's adhesion to the international system of the UN
prohibits any manifestation suggestive of force outside or even on the
fringes of the procedures and processes established by that system.1 48
http://sitios.poderjudicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional/Constitucion%20Politica/Sentencias/20
04/04-09992.htm.
140. Id. at¶3.
141. Id. at15.
142. Id. at Portanto.
143. Id. at Considerando ¶ VI.
144. Id. at T X.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.at¶XI.
148. Id.
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Therefore, declaring the armed conflict lawful or unlawful was of no
material relevance whatsoever, when from the Costa Rican perspective it
was incorrect, constitutionally speaking, to support the use of force
outside the action framework of the UN.1 49 After finding that the actions
in Iraq undertaken by the Coalition of the Willing were clearly not
covered by UN-system law, the Constitutional Chamber determined that
the challenged acts and pronouncements of the executive power clearly
manifested its support inasmuch for the objectives of the coalition as for
the means in pursuance thereof, without any hint that the solidarity
extended only to fighting terror and spreading peace, liberty, and
democracy in Iraq.150
Hence, the Communiqu6 and other
pronouncements of the executive in moral support of the Coalition of the
Willing had to fall.151
c.
The German Case: Incidental Review of UN-System Law in
the Context of a Soldier's Refusal to Obey Orders
In the German case, the question of whether the military action
against Iraq was covered by extant UN-system law arose in the course of
disciplinary proceedings against Major Florian Pfaff. When instructed to
participate in the development of a military software program, Major
Pfaff had informed his superiors of his decision not to obey any army
orders that, carried out, would make him complicit in what he considered
Germany's unlawful contributions to an illegal war of aggression against
Iraq.1 5 2 After Major Pfaff was found guilty of service malfeasance
(Dienstvergehen) and demoted in rank to captain with a court martial, the
decision was appealed to the Second Senate for Military Service (Zweiter
Wehrdienstsenat) of the Federal Supreme Administrative Court
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht).53
The Second Senate for Military Service overturned the decision of
the court martial and gave the soldier a full acquittal. 154 According to the
court, the solder did not commit a service malfeasance because he was
not disobedient in regards to his official duty of service and because he
did not otherwise breach his duties under the Law on Soldiers
(Soldatengesetz).'s5 The court offered its legal opinion relative to the
149. Sala Constitucional, Res. No. 2004-09992, at Considerando ¶ XI.
150. Id. at T IX.
151. Id. at¶ XI.
152. Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court] June 21,
2005, 2 WD 12.04 (5, 15-23), http://www.bverwg.de/entscheidungen/pdf/210605U2WD
12.04.0.pdf.
153. Id. (5-9).
154. Id. (1, 11, 125-26).
155. Id. (25).
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military combat operations in Iraq under UN-system law when analyzing
whether the order subject to the proceedings was to be deemed nonbinding because it violated the soldier's freedom of conscience.15 6
According to the court, Major Pfaff took his decision of conscience in
the context of the war against Iraq by the Coalition of the Willing, which
was ongoing when the opinion was issued.' 57 The court then determined
that this war exhibited "grave concerns under international law"
(schwere valkerrechtliche Bedenken), which stemmed from the absence
of a justification under UN-system law.158
After finding a prima facie violation of the prohibition on the use of
force by the Coalition of the Willing, the Second Senate for Military
Service ticked through the liberation, cease-fire, and last-chance
decisions." 9 It held that the liberation decision had expired because its
objectives had been accomplished in 1990/91, after Iraq was ejected
from Kuwait, and therefore it could not authorize the use of force more
than a decade later.' 6 0 Next, the cease-fire decision could not authorize
the use of force for the following three reasons: (1) the pre-conditions
for the cease-fire had been met when Iraq consented in writing to fully
comply with its contents; (2) the cease-fire was never formally rescinded;
and (3) the UN Security Council had reserved the right to decide upon
further steps. 16
Zeroing-in on the last-chance decision, the court
distilled several reasons why it did not furnish a valid authorization
either.162 In that instrument, according to the court, the UN Security
Council had left open how it would decide if Iraq had been reported in
breach of the demands and inspection regime imposed on it. 63
Furthermore, it had not elaborated upon the meaning of its warning to
Iraq of facing "serious consequences."' 64 Also, the UN Security Council
had explicitly decided to remain seized of the matter, which the court
interpreted as meaning that the UN Security Council did not want to
leave the decision-making to others or to approve or otherwise legitimize
the use of force sought by the Coalition of the Willing.1 65 If the UN
Security Council had intended to authorize the use of force, the court
added, it would have needed to say so textually.1 66 Hence, the absence of

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. (28-46).
Id.
Id. (71, 72-80).
Id. (73-77).
Id. (73-74).
Id. (74-75).
2 WD 12.04 (76-77).
Id (76).
Id.
Id. (76-77).
Id. (77).

2016]1

GUIDANCE AND CONTROL MECHANISMS

165

a definition of serious consequences precluded a finding of a sufficient
basis for authorization. 167 The court further rejected the assertion that the
United States and the United Kingdom would not have voted for the final
version of the last-chance decision that did not contain the desired useof-force authorization.1 6 8 According to the court, any actual or purported
mental reservations on the part of the representatives from the United
States and the United Kingdom had to be immaterial since the text did
not even mention the word "authorization." 169 The court explained that
this was the reason why the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Spain attempted to codify a positive and explicit authorization in a
subsequent resolution, albeit unsuccessfully. 170
The Second Senate for Military Service found that the soldier
embraced these grave concerns under international law with regard to
both the Iraq war1 7 ' as well as Germany's contributions as a launch pad
and logistics hub in support of the military operations in Iraq, which
triggered in him a severe moral conflict.1 72 In this regard, the court did
not deem it necessary that his participation in the software project
supported and sustained the war effort.1 73 Rather, a serious possibility of
such an outcdme and his fear of making himself complicit were enough
to justify a severe strain on his conscience. 174 Therefore, when
comnmissioned as a recruit and professional soldier he did not have to
take into account that Germany might engage in contributions causing
grave concerns under international law and that his service might be a
part thereof.175 The court was fully persuaded in light of the record that
the decision of conscience by the soldier was taken in view of his ethical
compass and that the condition of his state of mind was so serious, deep,
and compelling as to impede him from carrying out his orders without a
severe moral conflict.1 7 6
2.

First Parameter: Political Question Doctrines

According to the classical test developed by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the political question doctrine is triggered when a court, in the
process of querying whether it is seized of a matter, deems the political

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (77).
Id. (71, 72-80).
2 WD 12.04 (71, 80-100).
Id (71-72, 94-99).
Id. (71, 98-99).
Id. (99).
Id. (99-105).
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system of accountability to be the best mechanism for resolving an issue
when one of the following six factors is met:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.1 77
When called to adjudge certain strategic decisions taken by the
executive power, British courts regularly test the analogue to the
American political question doctrine in the preliminary threshold stage of
justiciability.1 8 In the Iraq opinion from the United Kingdom, the
Administrative Court gives full expression of the doctrine. Beyond
affirming the existence of sensitive, no-go, or forbidden areas of
executive action, it firmly declines "to embark upon the determination of
an issue if to do so would be damaging to the public interest [and
embarrassing to the government] in the field of international relations,
national security or defence." 179
In Costa Rica, the political question doctrine (doctrina de la
cuesti6n politica) exhibits a mixed record in the recent history of
constitutional jurisprudence.1so It may even be on the retreat.8 In
contrast to the British court's deferential posture of staying out of
government decisions in the political and diplomatic space such as that
177. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
178. David Jenkins, Judicial Review Under a British War Powers Act, 43
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 611 (2010) (undertaking a comparative analysis of how U.S.
courts apply the political question doctrine in war powers cases and how British courts
might exercise review under a hypothetical British "war powers act").
179. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament v. The Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and The
Secretary of State for Defence Advisory declaration [2002] EWHC 2777 ¶ [47] (Admin)
(QBD) (UK).
180. Dante Figueroa, La Doctrina Estadounidense de la Cuesti6n Politica:
Etiologia, Axiologia, y Perspectivaspara Latinoamirica,IX IusDOCTRINA, Law Review
of the University of Costa Rica's Law School 8 (2013), http://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php
/iusdoctrina/article/view/13564/12852 (observing that, in its recent history, Costa Rica
exhibits mixed approximations to the Political Question Doctrine).
181. Pedro Nestor Sagii6s, Constituci6n y Sociedad: La Revisidn de las Cuesti6nes
PoliticasNo Justiciables (A Prop6sito de la "Coalici6n" contra Saddam Hussein), Aflo
XIII NO 13 PENSAMIENTO CONSTITUCIONAL 73, 93 (2008) (diagnosing that the doctrine,
which has political and pragmatic origins, has evolved over time and tends to dissipate in
Costa Rica).

2016]

GUIDANCE AND CONTROL MECHANISMS

167

of going to war, the Iraq decision by the Constitutional Chamber 82
showcases active judicial intervention by a special courtl 83 entrusted with
exercising completely concentrated judicial review. 18 4
Generous
conceptions of standing facilitate access to the Constitutional Chamber
for almost anyone-without the need for an actual case or a factual
basis-as long as the petition invokes a collective interest in judicial
intervention. 85 The Iraq decision of the court does not mention
justiciability or separation of powers. Rather, by embracing the process
of constitutional "judicialization" (judicializaci6n) fully from the
perspective of its institutional raison d'8tre and design,186 the court's
control of the executive branch is not hindered by these doctrines
because the sheer force of the parameter of peace, which springs from a
living organism of constitutional values (constituci6n viva), 187 permeates
all facets of political life. This allows the court, when scrutinizing the
Costa Rican Government's support activities against the constitutional
measuring stick of peace, to squarely decide that they cross the line into
the constitutionally impermissible, even if the goals as such might be
laudable. Still, it remains uncertain how and when the Government of
Costa Rica could have better conveyed that its solidarity operated
exclusively vis-d-vis the goals pursued by the coalition.
182. Robert S. Barker, ConstitutionalJustice and the Separation of Powers: The
Case of Costa Rica-A Translation into English of an Article by Justice Luis Fernando
Solano Carrera, 47 DuQ. L. REv. 871, 895-99 (2009); Fernando Cruz Castro, Costa
Rica's ConstitutionalJurisprudence, Its PoliticalImportance and InternationalHuman
Rights Law: Examination of Some Decisions, 45 DUQ. L. REv. 557, 570-73; Robert S.
Barker, Stability, Activism and Tradition: The Jurisprudence of Costa Rica's
ConstitutionalChamber, 45 DUQ. L. REv. 523, 543-46 (2007).
183. Massimo lovane, Domestic Courts Should Embrace Sound Interpretive
Strategies in the Development of Human Rights-Oriented International Law, in
REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 622 (Antonio Cassese ed.,
2012).
184. See, e.g., Violaine Autheman, Global Lessons Learned: ConstitutionalCourts,
JudicialIndependence and the Rule of Law 3-4 (IFES Rule of Law White Paper Series,
Keith Henderson ed., 2004), http://pdfusaid.gov/pdf docs/PBAAB592.pdf.
185. Rep. of the Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating
to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, John H. Knox 9,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/53/Add.1, at 9, ¶ 27 (Apr. 8, 2014).
186. For descriptions of the history, design, and jurisprudence of the Constitutional
Chamber, see, for example, Bruce M. Wilson, Constitutional Rights in the Age of
Assertive Superior Courts: An Evaluation of Costa Rica's ConstitutionalChamberof the
Supreme Court, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 451 (2012); Bruce M. Wilson, Enforcing Rights
and Exercising an Accountability Function: Costa Rica's ConstitutionalChamber of the
Supreme Court, in COURTS IN LATIN AMERICA 55 (Gretchen Helmke & Julio RiosFigueroa eds., 2011).
187. Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Res. No. 2004-09992, Dkt.
No. 03-004485-0007-CO, Considerando ¶ IV (Costa Rica Sept. 8, 2004, 2:31 PM),
http://sitios.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional/Constitucion%20
Politica/Sentencias/2004/04-09992.htm.
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In Germany, it is said that "[n]othing done by government is beyond
judicial review." 188 Pursuant to Germany's overarching constitutional
principle of a state under law (Rechtsstaatsprinzip), all public authority
must be lawfully exercised, 189 and anyone whose rights are violated by
public authority has recourse to the courts. 190 In this sense, Germany's
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfaj3ungsgericht) has steadily
reserved the right to control the constitutionality of the government's
conduct in the realm of foreign affairs. 191 However, in practice, the
Federal Constitutional Court accords the executive power some latitude
when making certain factual assessments and prognoses (Beurteilungsund Prognosespielraum).192
The Iraq decision by the Second Senate for Military Service
highlights the absence of a formal first filter corresponding to the
practice of Anglo-American courts immunizing the government's
conduct in foreign affairs from judicial scrutiny. At first blush, the
judgment appears to offer an elaborate scholarly opinion regarding the
legality of the military action against Iraq by the Coalition of the Willing
and, in consequence, Germany's contributions in support of the
campaign and the occupation. 19 3 However, the court stops short of
sharing the prevailing view in the German literature that the military
action was illegal. It does not make a hard determination in this regard
but rather couches the result of its analysis in the locution of grave
concerns under international law 194-a label that appears 15 times in the

188.
THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS:
RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 110 (1992).

DOES THE

189. Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany] Dec. 23,
2014, art.19, para. 4 (Ger.).
190. Id.
191. Nikolaus Schultz, Was the War on Iraq Illegal?-The German Federal
Administrative Court'sJudgement of21st June 2005, 7 GERMAN L. J. 25, 38 (2005).
192. See, e.g., Cormac Mac Amhlaigh, Does Germany need a political
questions doctrine? EUTOPIA LAW (Feb. 21, 2014), http://eutopialaw.com/2014/02/21/
does-germany-need-a-political-questions-doctrine/ (emphasizing that "what [the Federal
Constitutional Court] does not do is determine, as a preliminary issue, whether the
subject-matter is such that it is not appropriate, for practical or democratic reasons, that a
court be seized of a particular dispute"); Thomas Giegerich, Verfassungsgerichtliche
Kontrolle der auswdrtigen Gewalt im europdisch-atlantischen Verfassungsstaat:
Vergleichende Bestandsaufnahme mit Ausblick auf die neuen Demokratien in Mittel-und
Osteuropa, 57 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 409, 430, 433 (1997), http://www.zaoerv.de/57
1997/57 1997 2 3 a 409 564.pdf (diagnosing that, contrary to the prevailing
literature, a rightly understood political question doctrine has its place in German
constitutional law and has indeed occupied it in the jurisprudence of the Federal
Constitutional Court in substance, albeit not by name).
193. Schultz, supra note 191, at 25.
194. Id. at 25-27, 37.
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judgment.1 95 This is not due to the shackles of the political question
doctrine as suchl 96 but to the court's diagnosis being wrapped into its
analysis of whether the soldier's exercise of his basic right to freedom of
conscience disabled the -service order. 19 7
In this context, a dual
apprehension of potentialities in the soldier's mind was sufficient to
activate basic right protections-that Germany possibly supported a war
effort that was possibly illegal. The stance of the court with regard to the
operation of political question rationales would in all likelihood have had
to become much clearer, if it had reviewed the Iraq situation under a
different stand-alone ground for disabling insubordination, namely, the
infringement of general rules of international law. 198 It would then have
needed to make a hard illegality determination.
3.

Second Parameter: Monism or Dualism

Doctrines explaining the relationship between international law and
domestic law have traditionally been grouped into one of two schools:
dualism and monism.1 99
According to the theory of dualism,
international law and domestic law are independent of one another.200
They differ in terms of their respective sources of law, subject matter,
legal addressees, and coercive scope.201 Since both legal orders exist in
parallel, a national legal act is necessary to bring about the municipal
validity of international law within the domestic space.202 Dualism exists
in two variants: radical dualism and moderate dualism. Radical dualism
allows both legal orders to co-exist but in strict separation and without
any overlap.2 03 Therefore, should a conflict arise between a municipal
legal act (a statute law, a judgment, or an administrative act) and
international law, each law remains unaffected and continues to stand.
Moderate dualism on the other hand recognizes some degree of overlap
between international law and domestic law. Both legal orders intersect

195. Manuel Ladiges, Irakkonflikt und Gewissenskonflikte, WISSENSCHAFT UND
SICHERHEIT ONLINE, 6 n.58 (Mar. 22, 2007), http://www.sicherheitspolitik.de/uploads/
media/wus_02_2007_irakkonflikt-gewissenskonflikt.pdf.
196. Id. at37-38.
197. Id. at 26.
198. Id. at 4.
199. For a detailed review of monism and dualism in international law doctrines, see
CHRISTINE
AMRHEIN-HOFMANN,
MONISMUS
UND
DUALIsMUs
IN
DEN
VOLKERRECHTSLEHREN (2003).
200.
GEORG DAHM, JOST DELBROCK & RODIGER WOLFRUM, I/1 VOLKERRECHT 99

(1988).
201. Id. at 99-100.
202. Id. at 100.
203.
MICHAEL SCHWEITZER, STAATSRECHT
EUROPARECHT 12, para. 32 (2010).

III:

STAATSRECHT,

VOLKERRECHT,
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when norms refer to the other legal order or when norms are transformed
from one order to the other.2 04 Should municipal law be in conflict with
international law each remains intact but the State becomes
internationally responsible for the breach of its international obligations;
in the long run, international law eventually prevails.2 05
In contrast to dualism, monism posits that only one overall legal
order exists comprising both international law and domestic law. 206 In
consequence, international law is integrated into domestic law from its
moment of inception. 207 Though the question of rank arises, the answer
is determined according to two doctrinal variants: monism with the
primacy of domestic law and monism with the primacy of international
law.208 Under the former, international law always gives way to
municipal law. 2 0 9 This theory, however, reduces international law to the
whim of every single legal order in the world and thereby destroys the
goal of legal uniformity. The alternative variant is radical monism with
the primacy of international law, under which municipal law is trumped
and obliterated by international law. 2 10 A moderated version of monism
with the primacy of international law posits that while municipal law
stays provisionally around when in conflict with international law, the
State is bound to come into compliance with international law. 2 11 Not
surprisingly, in their Iraq decisions, the three courts reflect very different
approaches to positioning international law, more specifically UNsystem law, which is secondary international law made in pursuance of
international treaty law, within their respective legal orders.
The United Kingdom adheres to the doctrine of strict dualism. 2 12
Thus, international law treaties have no special status and no automatic
effect in municipal law.2 13 Inasmuch as the provisions of a treaty have
been transposed into domestic law, the implementing legislation is
dispositive with regard to the rise of private rights and remedies for
alleged treaty breaches.2 14 Typically, in the absence of such legislation,
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 12, para. 33.
Id at 12-13, para. 33.
DAHM ET AL., supra note 200, at 100.
Id.
Id.
Id
SCHWEITZER, supra note 203, at 11, para. 28.
Id. at 11, para. 29.
Anthony Aust, United Kingdom, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY
ENFORCEMENT 476, 476 (David Sloss ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2014) ("When it comes
to treaties, the United Kingdom is very much a dualist state."); Nallaratnam Singarasa v.
Attorney-General, S.C. Spl. (LA) No. 182/99 (2006) ("The constitutional premise of the
United Kingdom . . adheres to the dualist theory.").
213. Aust, supra note 212, at 477.
214. See id. at 487.

2016]

GUIDANCE AND CONTROL MECHANISMS

171

the courts will not accord a remedy for treaty breaches. 2 15 Since "neither
the [UN] Charter nor [UN Security Council] resolutions [have] been
incorporated into English law," 216 it is not surprising that the Iraq opinion
from the United Kingdom is so calm and unwavering about its adherence
to the strictly dualist posture in declining "jurisdiction to declare the true
interpretation of an international instrument which has not been
incorporated into English domestic law and which it is unnecessary to
interpret for the purposes of determining a person's rights or duties under
domestic law." 217
Costa Rica subscribes to the school of radical monism with the
primacy of international law (monismo con primacia del Derecho
Internacional).2 18
Thus, its Political Constitution confers onto
international agreements authority superior to domestic laws (autoridad
superior a las leyes). 2 19 The Iraq decision from Costa Rica adds yet
another dimension by enlisting international elements to elucidate the
contents and reach of the constitutional value of peace, thereby melding
the international and municipal planes into a monist amalgamate of at
least a quasi-constitutional rank amenable to be readily vindicated by
anyone under widely open conceptions of locus standi. In its reasoning
with regard to the relevant UN-system law, however, the Constitutional
Chamber shrinks from carefully developing its very own construction
and deconstruction of the meaning and effects of the last-chance
decision, which it simply reproduces without much commentary. Is its
insufficiency to cover the invasion so clear to the judges? It certainly
appears that the court would disagree with the proposition that an
arguable case, as Lord Goldsmith put it in the course of advising Her
Majesty's Government, would suffice to cover the invasion under extant
UN-system law absent a fresh authorization by the UN Security Council.
The court signals this understanding when observing that any use of
force would need to be fully and squarely, and not merely arguably,
within the envelope of the requisite procedures established by the
international system of the UN. 220 Finally, in pursuance of its radically
215. See id. at 487, 503.
216. ANTHONY AuST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 53 (2013).
217. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament v. The Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and The
Secretary of State for Defence Advisory declaration [2002] EWHC 2777 ¶ [47] (Admin)
(QBD) (UK).
218. Jorge Enrique Romero Pdrez, El Derecho InternacionalPliblicoy El Derecho
Nacional, REVISTA DE CIENCIAS JURIDICAS 91 (2012).
219.

CRPOL. CONST. art. 7.

220. Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Res. No. 2004-09992, Dkt.
No. 03-004485-0007-CO, Considerando [ IV (Costa Rica Sept. 8, 2004, 2:31 PM),
http://sitios.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional/Constitucion%20Politica/Sentencias/
2004/04-09992.htm.
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monist posture, the Constitutional Chamber deems an act not covered by
international law when it is either "outside" (fuera) or merely "on the
fringes" (al marjen) of UN-system law.221
Germany leans towards the doctrine of moderate dualism
(gemjifigter Dualismus).2 22 Treaties with legislative approval rank on
par with domestic legislation.2 23 However, there has been a debate about
how this effect arises. Under the rejected theory of wholesale adoption
(Adoptionstheorie), the domestic approval law of incorporation preserves
the international law character of the treaty.224 The traditional theory of
transformation(Transformationstheorie)construes the domestic approval
law as discharging a dual role. In addition to consenting to the
international act of ratification, it transposes the treaty from the
international to the municipal realm. 22 5 Pursuant to the more progressive
theory of execution (Vollzugstheorie), the domestic approval law is
construed as an order to follow the treaty as international law within the
domestic space.226
Independent of whether one follows the
transformation or the execution theory,227 Germany acceded to the UN in
the wake of the passage of its domestic approval law. 22 8 In the literature,
the question has arisen as to whether the German legislator also intended
to transfer real sovereign powers to the UN and make UN-system law
internally binding and enforceable by the courts.22 9 Most commentators
remain skeptical because the UN Charter, as the international law treaty
to which the approval. law consents, binds UN members as such;
however, it does not imply that the UN Council, through UN-system law,
has the prerogative to exercise such powers within the States. 2 30 The Iraq
decision from the German Second Senate for Military Service is not on
point in this regard. First, the court touches on peace coercion against a
member country, as opposed to legislative measures by the UN Council
implicating individuals or organizations. Second, the court is not even
indirectly "in the service of enforcing international law," 23 1 because the
221.
222.
223.

Id.at¶VII.

supra note 203, at 11, para. 38.
Andreas L. Paulus, Germany, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY
ENFORCEMENT 209, 217 (David Sloss ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2014).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 217-18
227. Id
228. Gesetz vom 6.6.1973 (law dated June 6, 1973), BGBI II, 430.
UND
DES
RICHTERS
GESETZESBINDUNG
SCHRODER,
229. MEINHARD
RECHTSWEGGARANTIE IM MEHREBENENSYSTEM 209-10 (2010).
230. Id at 210.
[BVerfGE]
[Federal
des
Bundesverfassungsgericht
231. Entscheidungen
Constitutional Court], 111 BVerfGE 307, 328 (2004). For commentary, see Paulus,
supra note 223, at 223.
SCHWEITZER,
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case discusses the effects of UN-system law on the basic right to freedom
of conscience in the context of a soldier's conscientious objection and
situational refusal to obey orders in the armed forces.232
4.
Summation:
Combinations of Parameters Shaping the
Availability and Intensity of Judicial Review of the Executive Power's
Construction of UN-System Law
In their ensemble, the three decisions highlight a larger spectrum.
On one end, the combination of justiciability doctrines with strict
dualism will, in all likelihood, foreclose the construction of UN-system
law by courts of law. This is the case in the United Kingdom. At the
other end of the spectrum, when the absence of a political question
doctrine and adherence to radical monism with the primacy to
international law combine, judicial review of acts and activities by the
executive will become available. Such is the case in Costa Rica. Finally,
the combination of judicial restraint short of a political question doctrine
and moderate dualism leads to a more fluid, case-specific diagnosis
regarding the degree of judicial control by a court of law. This is the
case in Germany.
B.

The InternationalPlane

In the international domain judicial proceedings never materialized.
But conceivably, recourse could have been sought in two standing
international tribunals-the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the
International Criminal Court (ICC).
1.
Route to the ICJ: Request by the UN General Assembly for an
Advisory Opinion
The ICJ enjoys a dual jurisdiction.
In addition to deciding
contentious cases between States, the ICJ gives advisory opinions on
legal questions in response to requests from within the UN System.
It was highly improbable that the Iraq situation could be made the
subject of a contentious case before the ICJ. First, its jurisdiction is

232. See JUrgen Rose, Conscience in Lieu of Obedience: Cases of Selective
Conscientious Objection in the German Bundeswehr, in WHEN SOLDIERS SAY No:
SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN THE MODERN MILITARY 177, 185-88 (Andrea
Ellner, Paul Robinson & David Whetham eds., 2014); Hans Georg Bachmann,
Militarischer Gehorsam und Gewissensfreiheit, in RECHT UND MILITAR: 50 JAHRE
RECHTSPFLEGE DER BUNDESWEHR 156, 156-68 (Holger Zetsche & Stephan Weber eds.,
2006).
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limited to disputes between States.233
Thus, individuals and
governmental and non-governmental organizations cannot be parties in
contentious cases. In addition, States must have consented to the ICJ's
exercise of its jurisdiction. This consent can be enshrined in a special
agreement, a treaty clause, or an optional declaration recognizing the
ICJ's jurisdiction as compulsory. 2 34 Therefore, the United States could
not have been made a defendant in a contentious case based on the ICJ's
compulsory jurisdiction in legal disputes over questions of international
law, because it had long withdrawn its optional declaration already
heavily reserved and modified at the time.235 While the United Kingdom
has an optional declaration in place,236 States without. a matching
declaration, such as Iraq, would have failed the reciprocity requirement
for opening up the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction in a case against the
United Kingdom. 2 37 Finally, a third State with a reciprocal optional
declaration would still have needed to surmount the hurdle of having to
assert a real and actual controversy with the United Kingdom over its
legal rights at the time when the case was presented.238
233.

Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 34 [hereinafter

ICJ Statute].
234.
Id. at art. 36.
235.
United States:

Department

of State Letter and

Statement

concerning

Termination of Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction, 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985). See
also 84 Dep't of State Bull. 89 (June 1984) (attempting to exclude "disputes with any
Central American state" so as to avoid ICJ jurisdiction in the Nicaragua case); Sean D.
Murphy, The United States and the International Court of Justice: Coping with
Antinomies, in THE SWORD AND THE SCALES: THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL

COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 46, 67 n.69 (Cesare P. R. Romano ed., 2009) (noting that the
United States: (1) "declined to participate in the ensuing merits phase of the Nicaragua
case, which led to a judgment against the United States on several counts" (Military and

Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 ICJ
Rep. 14 (June 27)); and (2) "ignored the Court's judgment and vetoed measures of
implementation sought by Nicaragua at the Security Council"). For the optional

declaration by the United States prior to the Nicaragua controversy, see 1982-1983 YB.
I.C.J. 88, 88-89 (1983).
236. For the full declaration by the United Kingdom (as of Dec. 31, 2014), see
Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, International
Court of Justice [hereinafter UK Optional Declaration], http://www.icjcij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?pl=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=GB ("The Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland accept as compulsory ipso facto
and without special convention, on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the

International Court of Justice, in conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute
of the Court, until such time as notice may be given to terminate the acceptance, over all
disputes arising after 1 January 1984, with regard to situations or facts subsequent to the

same date . . . ").
237. ICJ Statute, supra note 233, art. 36 ¶¶ 2-3; UK Optional Declaration, supra note
236 ("on condition of reciprocity").
238. ICJ Statute, supra note 233, arts. 34, 38, 41. See Goldsmith Final Advice, supra
note 77, para. 32 (not totally discarding the eventuality that a State strongly opposed to
the use of force against Iraq could initiate a contentious case and ask for interim relief).
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Nevertheless, the most promising means for throwing an obstacle in
the way of the march to war by the Coalition of the Willing could have
been for the UN General Assembly to request an advisory opinion from
the ICJ on the question as to whether military action in Iraq, absent a
fresh UN Security resolution, would be in accordance with UN-system
law. If the UN General Assembly had adopted a resolution transmitting
the request for an advisory opinion, the ICJ would, if past were
prologue, 23 9 have reached the substance of the question.
Independent of the ICJ's answer, 24 0 no State, whether with or
against the Coalition of the Willing, could have prevented it from being
rendered 2 41 because the advisory opinion embodies the ICJ's assistance
in law lent to the UN General Assembly, as opposed to a decision handed
down in a real and actual dispute between proponents and opponents of
the use of force against Iraq. Yet, the substance of the ICJ's guidance
would have reached States with an interest in the Iraq situation through
the UN General Assembly as a conduit.2 42 If the ICJ had determined that
military action in Iraq absent a fresh UN Security Council resolution
would not be in accordance with UN-system law, the UN General
Assembly would likely have passed a resolution 2 43 urging members not
to take any action in contravention of the advisory opinion. Such a
resolution might have either remanded the Iraq situation to the
negotiating table at the UN Security Council or even avoided a military
conflict. In the alternative, it might have forced members of the
Coalition of the Willing to go ahead with the use of force against Iraq in
blatant disregard of the authoritative, albeit legally non-binding,
pronouncements by the UN General Assembly and the ICJ. On the other
hand, if the ICJ had determined that military action in Iraq, absent a fresh
UN Security resolution, would be in accordance with UN-system law,
this would have given the use of force by the Coalition of the Willing
international judicial cachet.
Ultimately, the idea of going through the UN General Assembly to
seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ never gathered enough steam.
239. For the most recent advisory opinion by the ICJ, see Accordance with
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo,
Advisory Opinion, 2010 ICJ Rep. 403 (July 22) [hereinafter Kosovo Advisory Opinion].
240.

For a collection of voices in the "yes" and "no" columns as to whether extant

UN-system law provided the requisite coverage for the use of force, see Did the UN
Security Council Resolution 1441 Provide Sufficient Legal Basis for Military Action
Against Iraq?, PROCON.ORG (Sept. 24, 2009, 1:12 PM), http://usiraq.procon.org/

view.answers.php?questionlD= 000875 (last visited July 16, 2016).
241. See ANDREAS ZIMMERMANN, KARIN OELLERS-FRAHM & CHUSTIAN TOMUSCHAT,
THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 1621 (2012).

242. See id
243. For the practice of the UN General Assembly with regard to advisory opinions
rendered by and received from the ICJ, see id
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Perhaps too many delegations realized that the invasion would arrive
sooner rather than later and that there simply was not enough time to
secure the guidance in law from the ICJ before the fact. Indeed, even
assuming that the UN General Assembly had passed a resolution with the
request in the immediate aftermath of the UN Security Council's lastchance decision in the fall of 2002, it was somewhat uncertain that the
UN General Assembly would have received the advisory opinion from
the ICJ before the spring of 2003. In addition, it was unlikely that the
Coalition of the Willing would have put its military planning activities
on hold during the pendency of the proceedings. Of course, if the UN
General Assembly had made the request with urgency or the ICJ itself
had found that an early answer was desirable, the ICJ would have been
required to do everything in its power to accelerate the procedure. 24
This could have included dispensing with the second written phase
normally conducted in its proceedings.245
Yet, while advisory
procedures do not tend to take long,246 the shortest time on record
between the request from the UN General Assembly and the rendering of
the opinion by the ICJ has been seven months.247 Other than the
potentially too-short window in time before the invasion, the thinking
amongst certain delegations might have been that the military action
would end quickly and in its wake, the UN system as a whole would
need much inner- and inter-institutional cohesion for purposes of
managing the post-conflict rehabilitation phase in Iraq.
Contrariwise and despite the massive U.S.-British troop buildup, it
also appears that an insufficient number of delegations were convinced at
the time that military action against Iraq was imminent, since
negotiations in the UN Security Council over a second decision
continued until not even a fortnight before the invasion. Or, more
generally, the reluctance by many delegations to rally behind the
adoption of a resolution transmitting a request for an advisory opinion to
the ICJ may have stemmed from their unwillingness to remove the Iraq
situation from the political and diplomatic dynamics under their direct
control to the courtroom where the outcome in a politically charged
situation, albeit only advisory in nature, was not subject to their
immediate influence.248
244.

International Court of Justice, Basic Documents, Rules of Court, art. 103,

http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/ index.php?pl=4&p2=3&p3=0.
245.
Raj Bavishi & Subbi Barakat, ProceduralIssues Related to the ICJ's Advisory
Jurisdiction, LEGAL RESPONSE INITIATIVE, at 5 (2012), http://legalresponseinitiative.

org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/BP41E-Briefing-Paper-The-ICJ-Advisory-OpinionProcedure- 1-June-2012.pdf (giving the example of the Wall case).
246.

ROBERT KOLB, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 1105 (2013).

247.

Bavishi & Barakat, supra note 245, at 5.

248.

MARK W. JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 152-53 (2012).
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Route to the ICC: Crime of Aggression

The international crime of aggression under the auspices of the ICC
could offer another gateway for the construction of UN-system law by an
international court. At the time of the Iraq conflict, however, the ICC
only had a mandate to examine conduct during an armed conflict (in
bello), but none to scrutinize the legality of a decision to engage in an
armed conflict (ad bellum). 24 9

As part of a compromise reached during the negotiations in 1998,250
the Rome Statute had listed the crime of aggression as one of the four
core crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, but deferred offering
substantive definitions or jurisdictional trigger mechanisms.2 5 This gap
was closed when the amendments defining the crime of aggression and
setting out the conditions for the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction were
adopted by consensus at the Review Conference of the Rome Statute,
which was held in Kampala in 201 0.252 Under the new framework, the
individual crime of aggression means "the planning, preparation,
initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an
act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations."2 53 When
unpacked, this dense definition of individual criminal responsibility
yields three major building blocks-the leadership clause, the actus reus
clause, and the threshold clause.254 First, the perpetrator must be a

249.

See generally Thomas S. Harris, Can the ICC Consider Questions on Jus ad

Bellum in a War Crimes Trial, 48 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 273 (2016).

250. Phillipe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on International
Criminal Court: The NegotiatingProcess, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 3, 10 (1999).
251. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90, art. 5.2 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. See also "Final Act of the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court," Annex I, Resolution F, para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/10 (1998), at
8-9 (directing the ICC's Preparatory Commission to "prepare proposals for a provision
on aggression, including the definition and Elements of Crimes of Aggression and
conditions under which the ICC shall exercise its jurisdiction with regard to this crime").
252. Assembly of States Parties Res. RC/Res.6, annex III (June 11, 2010)
[hereinafter Kampala Amendments], https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2010/06/201006
11%2005-56%20PM/CN.651.2010.pdf. See also Matthew Gillett, The Anatomy of an
International Crime: Aggression at the International Criminal Court, 1 (2012),
http://ssrn.com/abs tract-2209687. For a polite, but highly critical assessment by two
leaders of the U.S. delegation, see Harold Hongju Koh & Todd F. Buchwald, The Crime
ofAggression: The UnitedStates Perspective, 109 AM. J. INT'L. L. 257 (2015).
253. Kampala Amendments, supra note 252, art. 8 bis, para. 1.
254. See Handbook: Ratification and Implementation of the Kampala Amendments
to the Rome Statute of the ICC, Crime of Aggression, War. Crimes 8 (Liechtenstein
Institute on Self-Determination, 2012) [hereinafter Handbook].
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political or military leader 25 5 but not necessarily the only leader. Second,
he or she must have planned, prepared, initiated, or executed a State act
of aggression. This element presupposes that the State act of aggression
was committed.256 A State act of aggression in turn is defined as "the use
of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the [UN Charter]."257 Examples of such "kinetic force
directed against the [target] through military weaponry" 25 8 include, but
are not limited to, invasion, military occupation, bombardment, and
blockade. 2 5 9 Third, criminal responsibility for State acts of aggression is
limited to those uses of force, which, in light of their nature, severity, and
magnitude, amount to a violation of the UN Charter that is manifest and
not merely unlawful in a technical sense. 260
The new provisions governing the conditions under which the ICC
may exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression distinguish
between two trajectories based on the absence or presence of a referral
by the UN Security Council. Both routes require the activation of the
ICC's jurisdiction, which is predicated on the arrival of two cumulative
events. First, at least 30 State Parties must have ratified or accepted the
amendments.26 1 Second, the State Parties have to take a decision to
activate, at any time after January 1, 2017, by consensus or at least an
absolute two-thirds majority.2 62 The Kampala amendments contain no
legal obligation for their domestic implementation before or after
ratification.263
Several States, however, have in place domestic
provisions criminalizing aggression.264 They differ as to whether
domestic criminalization is extended only to their own leaders or
likewise to leaders of other States.265
The first trigger mechanism, which is based on State referral to the
ICC Prosecutor or the ICC Prosecutor proceeding proprio motu, offers a
consent-based jurisdictional regime for State Parties. Any State Party
may opt out of the ICC's jurisdiction by lodging a declaration to this
effect with the Registrar.266 Simply not opting out suffices for consent.
255. Kevin Jon Heller, Retreatfrom Nuremberg: The LeadershipRequirement in the
Crime ofAggression, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 477 (2007).
256. Gillett, supra note 252, at 8.
257. Kampala Amendments, supra note 252, art. 8 bis, para. 2, cl. 1.
258. Gillett, supra note 252, at 8.
259. Kampala Amendments, supra note 252, art. 8 bis, para. 2, cl. 2(a)-(g).
260. Gillett, supra note 252, at 23-26.
261. Kampala Amendments, supra note 252, arts. 15 bis, para. 2, 15 ter, para. 2.
262. Id. arts.15 bis, para. 3, 15 ter, para. 3.
263. Handbook, supra note 254, at 14.
264. Id
265. Id.
266. Kampala Amendments, supra note 252, art. 15 bis, para. 4.
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In contrast, the ICC does not exercise jurisdiction over non-State
Parties. 267 For purposes of this trigger, the UN Security Council does not
have to actively determine the presence of an act of aggression nor does
it have to authorize investigations. If it does, after being notified by the
ICC Prosecutor of his or her intention to open an investigation,26 8 such a
determination suffices. 26 9 In the absence of word from the UN Security
Council, the ICC Prosecutor may still proceed after waiting six months
from the initial notification and upon receiving the authorization by the
judges of the ICC Pre-Trial Division.270 The second trigger mechanism,
which is based on UN Security Council referral, does not require the
satisfaction of any of the tailored conditions imposed on State referral or
proprio motu.271 Notably, the exercise of the ICC's jurisdiction is not
predicated upon any type of consent furnished by the involved States.
Since it was agreed early on in the amendment process that the
envisaged provision on aggression would be prospective in nature only,
there could be no prosecution at the ICC of the Iraq situation under the
aggression amendments in their current form.272 Yet, the Iraq situation
must have colored the United Kingdom's posture in the amendment
process. For example, in the deliberations about the trigger mechanisms
for the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, the
United Kingdom vigorously favored giving exclusivity to the UN
Security Council in line with its responsibility under UN Chapter VII.273
This stance, of course, is not surprising since it would have enabled the
United Kingdom to wield its veto power and avoid the onset of ICC
jurisdiction at its pleasure. Although the Review Conference ultimately
did not adopt the position of the United Kingdom, the comments by the
United Kingdom welcoming the final text still invoke the "primacy" of
the UN Security Council with respect to the maintenance of international
peace and security, while at the same time speaking of a "mutually
reinforcing relationship" between the UN Security Council and the
ICC. 2 74 At present, the United Kingdom does not rank among those who
have consented to the amendments adopted at Kampala.2 75
267. Id. art. 15 bis, para. 5.
268. Id. art. 15 bis, para. 6.
269. Id art. 15 bis, para. 7.
270. Id. art. 15 bis, para. 8.
271. Id. art. 15 ter, paras. 1-5.
272. Gillett, supra note 252, at 17 n.76.
273. See id at 5 n.23.
274. Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
Kampala, 31 May-11 June, Official Records, Annex VIII 124 (International Criminal
Court, 2010).
275. Status of Ratification and Implementation, GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR
RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KAMPALA AMENDMENTS ON THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION, http://crimeofaggression.info/the-role-of-states/status-of-ratification-and-im
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Even if purely theoretical, playing through the Iraq situation
highlights an open flank in the new regime governing the crime of
aggression. Logically, the availability of exceptions to prohibited uses of
force will deny the presence of a State act of aggression, which itself is a
prerequisite for individual criminal responsibility. UN Security Council
approval of the use of force in a certain situation would supply such an
exception. 276 This wu
would return us full circle to the question of how
explicit the authorization must be and how implicit, or arguable, it can
be.277 Certainly, as much as the paradox of a UN Security Council
determining an act of aggression in the wake of having previously passed
a resolution under UN Chapter VII, construed by some as an
authorization to use of force, will rarely arise, it may be incumbent upon
the ICC Prosecutor, once his or her mandate will have vested, to construe
the meaning and effects of UN-system law when seeking to initiate an
investigation in the wake of allegations concerning the legality of a
This is quite a significant horizon for the judicial
conflict.278
construction of UN-system law.
IV. PERSPECTIVES

Steering and control mechanisms for the construction of UN-system
law in a case face a unique challenge. UN Security Council decisions are
the products of political and diplomatic negotiation and voting
processes; 279 and therefore, they frequently contain formulaic
compromises and open terms which, by design, are not drafted with the
chiseled precision of court judgments. 28 0 This interpretation challenge as
to what the law is and what it requires is vividly illustrated in the Iraq
situation, which ultimately was all about language memorialized in the
relevant UN-system law. 2 8' Accordingly, those called to interpret UNsystem law must resolve important questions. How clearly must a useof-force authorization be stated? 282 Does it have to be quite explicit in
plementation/ (last visited June 26, 2016) (identifying the United Kingdom as a State
Party having "made positive references to the amendments" at the 9th and 10th sessions
of the Assembly of States).
276. Gillett, supra note 252, at 16-17.
277. See id.
278. See Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court 4 (Feb. 9, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/4E2BC725-6A6340B8-8CDC-ADBA7BCAA91F/143684/OTP-letter-to_ senders reVenezuela_9_Febru
ary_2006.pdf.
279. Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 239, at para. 94.
280. See Christian Tomuschat, Der 11. September 2001 und seine rechtlichen
Konsequenzen, [2001] EUROPLISCHEGRUNDRECHTEZEITSCHRIFT (EuGRZ) 535, 545.

281. 2010 Transcript, supra note 47, at 244.
282. Philip Kunig, Das VlkerrechtalsRecht der Weltbevdlkerung, 41 ARCIV DES
Christian
Tomuschat,
(AVR)
327,
329
(2003);
VOLKERRECHTS
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light of its exceptional character? Or does, as Lord Goldsmith suggests,
the presence of an arguable case suffice?
This article has studied two guidance and control mechanismslegal advice as input into a government's decision process and judicial
review in courts of law. At first blush, when a government system
ensures that its internal decision process is guided by independent and
robust legal input, the need for control through unfettered access to
judicial review in courts of law appears not as pronounced. However, if
such precautionary checks are not in place, dysfunctional, or simply not
trusted by the public, the courts play a significant role. When court
review with regard to the proper construction of UN-system law is
sought, the design of the sluices for entry into the courtroom becomes
crucial.
The United Kingdom, Costa Rica, and Germany embody different
approaches to guidance and control mechanisms for the interpretation of
UN-system law. In the United Kingdom, in-house legal advice from
professional government lawyers has a long tradition. If exercised in a
milieu of independence and integrity, legal input into the decision
process offers a powerful ex ante safeguard. Ideally, advice from within
the government will carry much weight and authority as the client who
has requested it seeks frank legal input into a decision process aimed at
the lawful achievement of policies. 283 However, attendant conflict
pressures accrue from the advisor's own political party affiliation, his or
her status as a salaried minister of the crown, and his or her service at the
pleasure of the prime minister.284 In other words, the presence of these
factors may make the advice appear biased or lacking in candor despite
being the fruit of the exercise of best professional judgment.285 Or worse
yet, the advisor could come under political pressure to bend or slant the
advice in a particular way so as to accommodate and support an outcome
desired or already preordained by the government.286 These themes are
still playing out in the United Kingdom, as the Iraq Inquiry has not yet
released its. final report. Interestingly, the narrative in the public space
with regard to the performance of guidance and control mechanisms for
the interpretation of UN-system law in the Iraq situation is focused on
the deciders themselves rather than the role of the courts where judicial
review is regularly curtailed by the operations of justiciability doctrineVolkerrechtistkeinZweiklassenrecht,

Der
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und

seine

Folgen,

VEREINTENATIONEN (VN):
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DIE VEREINTENNATIONEN
SONDERORGANISATIONEN 41, 44 (2003).
283. ATORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, supra note 39, at 12.
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political question non-justiciability of acts of the executive in the arena
of foreign affairs and international relations 287 and dualistic nonjusticiability of unincorporated treaties.28 8
Conversely, self-monitoring within the government's decision
process seems much less of a concern if judicial review is readily
available to correct potential overreach by the executive branch in cases
turning on the interpretation of UN-system law. This is the case in Costa
Rica where a constitutional guardian is on hand. It is readily accessible,
undeterred by political question doctrines and vigorously committed to
the doctrine of radical monism. In Germany, the executive power is, at
least in theory, fully controlled by the courts. This commitment to
judicial review allows courts to speak to the construction of UN-system
law-at a minimum incidentally, but conceivably also more directly,
depending on the particular posture of the case.
In view of the disparateness of municipal system paradigms and
designs, the international plane could offer a lynchpin for resolving
questions of how to construe the meaning and effects of UN-system law.
The ICC, through the prism of its jurisdiction over crimes of aggression,
may at some point be called to construe the meaning and effects of UNsystem law. This horizon will become even more powerful once more
State actors embrace the ICC. In turn, the ICJ, while fully operational,
faces its own challenges. At present, the ICJ takes up contentious cases
between States and entertains requests for advisory opinions from within
the UN system.289 Due to the consent-based design of its contentious
jurisdiction over cases between States, it is highly improbable that the
ICJ will be called to decide an actual controversy over the interpretation
of UN-system law. Given that four of five veto powers on the UN
Security Council have not, or no longer have, in place an optional
declaration opening up the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction, even if a case
were decided, enforcement by the UN Security Council is even less
287. Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service (the GCHQ
case), [1985] AC 374, 398 (1985) ("[M]any of the most important prerogative powers
concerned with control of the armed forces and with foreign policy and with other
matters which are unsuitable for discussion or review in the Law Courts.") (per Lord
Fraser); R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Ferhut
Butt 116 ILR 607 (1999); Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament v. The Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and
The Secretary of State for Defence Advisory declaration [2002] EWHC 2777, ¶ [47]
(Admin) (QBD) (UK).
288. For the general proposition that a treaty only creates rights and duties in
domestic English law until an Act of Parliament gives effect to it, see, for example, J.H.
Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry, [1990] 2 A.C. 418
(HL); MICHAEL BARTON AKEHURST, MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 45

(1970).
289.

ICJ Statute, supra note 233, art. 34, 65.
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likely. 29 0 While embodying the more promising route to those interested

in the ICJ's review of UN-system law, the advisory jurisdiction of the
ICJ exhibits several open flanks. A request for an advisory opinion can
only originate from within the UN system, which is populated by State
representatives who would need to gel in sufficient majorities before a
request could filter through the United Nation's political organs and
specialized agencies. The framers deliberately excluded States from the
circle of originators in their own name. 29 1 A further question harks back
to the effect in law spawned by advisory opinions. In doctrine and
practice, advisory opinions have been described as declarative of the law
without binding force and without the effect of res judicata.292 The
practical reality is that within the invoking arena and beyond there must
be a political will to heed the ICJ's advice, whatever its contents may
be.293 Indeed, the record of advisory opinions, in terms of their
frequencies and effects, reflects rather low expectations in this regard.
In the light of the experiences discussed earlier with regard to
judicial review of the Iraq situation under UN-system law, two reform
proposals come to mind. One more modest reform would open the
advisory route by enabling any State to make a request of the ICJ. This
would make it easier and faster for any State to reach the ICJ because it
no longer would have to work through the UN General Assembly or the
UN Security Council. Yet, the same compliance concerns afflicting the
current system prevail, unless advisory opinions were given erga omnes
effects. An even bolder idea would be to confer upon the ICJ the
jurisdiction to render preliminary rulings or interlocutory judgments in
response to questions from municipal judges.294 Specific references from
the municipal to the international judges could of course be limited to
construing the meaning and effects of UN-system law. This reform
would open the ICJ to lawsuits by individual parties as vigilant
international law subjects 295 and ensure that international law is observed
in the interpretation of UN-system law. Restricting this function to
interpretation questions would make it very different from legality

290. S. Gozie Ogbodo, An Overview of Challenges Facingthe InternationalCourt of
Justice in the 21st Century, 18 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 93, 110-11 (2012).
291. JANs, supra note 248, at 152-53.
292. KOLB, supra note 246, at 1094; Kenneth L. Penegar, Relationship of Advisory
Opinions of the International Court of Justice to the Maintenance of World Minimum
Order, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 529, 555-57 (1965).
293. Penegar, supra note 292, at 557.
294. For a concise discussion identifying the relevant positions in the debate, along
with references to the topical literature and scholarship, see, for example, JANIS, supra
note 248, at 157-59.
295. Id at 157-58.
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control and full-scale judicial review of UN-system law.
However,
despite the allure of such a mechanism,297 the spectre of making the ICJ,
throughout the space of its subscribers, some kind of "constitutional"
guardian of international law would trigger staunch sovereigntists,
especially among the permanent members of the UN Security Council,
into stalling institutional reform.2 98
Thus, the prospects of any
amendments to the UN Charter 299 that would widen prerogatives of the
ICJ appear rather dim.
Still, despite the fact that the military action against Iraq went
ahead, it did not do so in an un-checked legal vacuum. Notwithstanding
the lessons that may be identified by the Iraq Inquiry, the United
Kingdom has in place a practice of legal input into government decisionmaking, including the construction of the meaning and effects of UNsystem law. One may disagree with Lord Goldsmith's proposition of an
arguable case in the context of the Iraq situation, but he documented his
advice at the time and defended it in subsequent years. Especially when
compared to what has trickled out from the vaults of other members of
the Coalition of the Willing, 30 0 the record made available to post hoc
public scrutiny in the United Kingdom is quite immense and relatively
deep. Moreover, the Costa Rican and German examples illustrate that
the review of UN-system law is not necessarily confined to the lofty
spheres of politics and diplomacy, but may actually play out in domestic
296.
See, e.g., Mark Angehr, The International Court of Justice's Advisory
Jurisdiction and the Review of Security Council and GeneralAssembly Resolutions, 103

Nw. U. L. REv. 1007, 1026 (2009); Jose E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1996).
297.
JANIS, supra note 248, at 159.
298.
See Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its
False Prophets, 79 FOR. AFF. 9 (2000), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/56621/
peter-j-spiro/the-new-sovereigntists-american-exceptionalism-and-its-false-pro
(Jan. 21,

2015).
299.
U.N. Charter, supra note 1, arts. 108-109.
300.
For Australia, see, for example, Special Feature-Advice on the Use of Force
against Iraq, 4 MELB. J. INT'L L. 177 (2003) (providing the Memorandum of Advice

provided to the Commonwealth Government by Bill Campbell QC of the AttorneyGeneral's Department and Chris Moraitis of the Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, two letters of advice provided to the Leader of the Federal Opposition, the Hon.
Simon Crean MP, one by George Williams and Devika Hovell of the University of New

South Wales, and the other by Grant Niemann of the Flinders University of South
Australia). For the United States, see, for example, Letter dated 20 March 2003 from the
Permanent Representative

of the United States of America to the United Nations

addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2003/351 (Mar. 21, 2003)
(providing Ambassador Negroponte's notification of the invasion by the coalition, along
with rationales for its justification); William H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald,
Preemption, Iraq and InternationalLaw, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 557 (2003) (offering with

more detail the positions of the Legal Adviser of the United States Department of State
and the Assistant Legal Adviser for Political-Military Affairs of the United States
Department of State).
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courts of law. In addition, judicial review of UN-system law may be
sought under existing and new international avenues. It would therefore
be premature indeed to label the guidance and control mechanisms at
work with regard to the construction of UN-system law in the Iraq
situation and beyond with the Ciceronian adage silent enim leges inter
arma ("for the laws fall silent in times of war").30
V.

POSTLUDE AND PRELUDE

On July 6, 2016, the final Report of the Iraq Inquiry-a 2.6 millionworded document comprising an Executive Summary and 12 volumes of
evidence, findings and conclusions-was released to the public.30 2
Notably, the report does not reach a view on the legality of the war,
offering instead that this question "could ...

only be resolved by a

properly constituted and internationally recognized Court."3 03 This, of
course, returns us full circle to this article's discussion of guidance and
control mechanisms for the construction of UN-system law.

301. Marcus Tulius Cicero, Pro Milione Oratio, in MARCUS TULIUS CICERO, TEN
ORATIONS, WITH THE LETTERS TO His WIFE 164, 167 (Richard Alexander von Minckwitz
ed., 1908). For usage of this phrase with a different sequence in words, see Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Many think it not only
inevitable but entirely proper that liberty give way to security in times of national crisisthat, at the extremes of military exigency, inter arma silent leges. Whatever the general
merits of the view that war silences law or modulates its voice, that view has no place in
the interpretation and application of a Constitution designed precisely to confront war
and, in a manner that accords with democratic principles, to accommodate it.").
302. Report, IRAQ INQUIRY, http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/.
303. Sir John Chilcot's Public Statement, 6 July 2016, IRAQ INQUIRY,
http://www.iraq inquiry.org.uk/the-inquiry/sir-john-chilcots-public-statement/.

